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The Liability of Accountants*
By Roger S. Baldwin
The accounting profession has recently been much in the public 
eye, not only in this country but abroad. The growing impor­
tance of accounting is being constantly demonstrated by the 
weight which is being attached to the reports of accountants and 
the criticism which is leveled against such reports.
Two questions are being asked: What does the accountancy 
profession owe to those who employ them and to the public, and 
what is the liability of the accountancy profession in the per­
formance of its duties? These two questions are in substance one.
The question of the liability of accountants has recently been 
emphasized by the litigation in the state of New York which 
culminated in the decision of the court of appeals of that state in 
what is popularly known as the Ultramares case.
In view of this it would seem that a consideration of that case 
at this time might not only be proper but also profitable, in order 
to determine what practical lessons may be learned from it.
When the Ultramares case reached the court of appeals of the 
state of New York it involved two questions, one of fraud and one 
of negligence.
On the question of fraud, the trial judge had decided that there 
was not sufficient evidence for submission to the jury (Ultra­
mares Corporation v. Touche, Opinion by Mr. Justice Walsh, N. Y. 
supreme court, trial term (1929), unreported). In this deci­
sion the five judges of the appellate division of the first depart­
ment of the supreme court of the state of New York concurred 
(Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 229 app. div. 581, N. Y. 
1930).
On the question of negligence the jury had rendered a verdict 
against the defendants but the trial judge, after further considera­
tion, had decided that the defendants were not liable as a matter 
of law and had set aside the verdict. On this point the appellate 
division disagreed, three judges voting that the defendants were 
liable for negligence, reinstating the verdict of the jury in favor of 
the plaintiff, and two judges voting that the defendants, as a 
matter of law, were not liable for negligence. On the question of
*Address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants, 
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negligence, therefore, the vote of all the judges who had passed 
on the question was even, three to three.
This score of the votes of the judges passing upon the liability 
of the defendant for negligence represented pretty well the uncer­
tainty of the question involved and the uncertainty as to its deci­
sion by the court of appeals (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 
N. Y. 170, 1931). The problem, as it presented itself to counsel, 
was first to demonstrate that the court of appeals was free to 
decide this question on the merits without feeling bound to hold 
the defendants liable for negligence because of prior authority or 
decisions; and then to demonstrate on the ground of expediency, 
if not of authority, that the defendants as a matter of law should 
not be held liable for negligence.
The questions of contributory negligence and proximate cause 
became incidental as the case was developed and were not neces­
sarily involved in the decision of the court of appeals. Without 
doubt, however, contributory negligence and proximate cause 
were considered by the jury, in accordance with the instructions 
of the trial court when the case was submitted to them. This was 
before it had been held by the trial court that the question of 
negligence should not have been submitted to the jury because of 
lack of privity of contract or direct relationship.
The Question of Negligence
Few cases in the United States had been found where liability 
was sought to be imposed upon accountants for negligence and in 
only one of them did the doctrine requiring privity of contract 
arise. In that one case such doctrine was expressly affirmed 
(Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406; 8 A.L.R. 461, 1919).
Four cases in New York, which involved negligence without 
privity of contract and where the defendants had been found 
liable, had been cited in the Ultramares litigation in the lower 
courts. These four cases, it was claimed by the plaintiff, showed 
the trend of general opinion in New York to be away from the 
English view on this branch of jurisprudence and towards a more 
liberal interpretation of liability in negligence for acts and words 
involving third persons or strangers to the contract.
The Buick case (MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 
382, 1916) was one where the owner of an automobile recovered 
damages from the manufacturer for personal injuries received by 
the owner because of an accident due to a defect in a wheel which 
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the manufacturer had not itself made but had incorporated in 
its product. The rule of liability there applied held a person 
responsible even to strangers for negligence of a character which 
puts human life in imminent danger, such as a false labeling of 
poison, a defect in a circular saw, a defect in a steam boiler, the 
faulty erection of a scaffold, the defective manufacture of a coffee 
urn, the destruction of a defective building, the furnishing of a de­
fective rope with knowledge of the purpose for which the rope 
was to be used. All of these cases involved a danger of injury 
to the person and are known as cases involving the doctrine of 
dangerous instrumentalities.
Referring to this case, Chief Judge Cardozo, who wrote the 
opinion of the court of appeals in the Ultramares case, said:
“ . . . what is released or set in motion is a physical force. 
We are now asked to say that a like liability attaches to the cir­
culation of a thought or a release of the explosive power resident in 
words (p. 181).”
The doctrine involved in the Buick case had never been 
applied by the court of appeals of the state of New York to cases 
involving injuries to property (P. G. Poultry Farm v. Newtown 
B.-P. Mfg. Co., 248 N. Y. 293, 1928).
The Glanzer v. Shepard case (Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 
1922) was one where the plaintiff, a buyer of beans, sought 
damages against a public weigher who, at the request of the 
seller, had certified as to the weight of the beans and had fur­
nished the plaintiff with a copy of his certificate which was 
addressed to the plaintiff. The weigher had been employed by 
the seller of the beans. The weigher was held liable, but to only 
one purchaser, namely the plaintiff, who was known to him, as 
was also the value of the beans. Furthermore, the weigher 
certified to what was, in the last analysis, a demonstrable fact, 
not open to dispute and involving no exercise of judgment.
The Erie Railroad case (International Products Co. v. Erie R.R., 
244 N. Y. 331, 1927) was one where a railroad company had given 
wrong information to the plaintiff as to the location of goods by 
reason of which the plaintiff did not recover its insurance on 
goods which were destroyed by fire.
The Phoenix National Bank case (Doyle v. Chatham & Phoenix 
Nat. Bank, 253 N. Y. 369, 1930) was one where the owner of 
certain bonds brought action against a bank, which was acting 
as trustee for bondholders under an indenture of trust, on the 
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ground that the bank had issued its certificate upon which he, as 
a prospective bondholder, had relied. Such certificate was to the 
effect that the bank held a certain type of collateral as security 
for the bonds owned by the plaintiff, when in fact the bank did 
not hold such security. There was involved merely a statement 
of fact, easily ascertainable, subject to no judgment or opinion 
and without qualification. More than that, an error in the cer­
tificate made the bank liable only to such persons as might own 
the bonds, and the limit of the liability would be the amount of 
the bonds or their value.
It was urged, therefore, by counsel for the American Institute 
of Accountants, appearing as amicus curiae, that the court of 
appeals of the state of New York, in its trend away from the 
English and the earlier American rule that there could be no 
liability in negligence where there was no privity of contract, was 
not committed to the position of holding that an action for 
negligence could be upheld, where no direct relationship existed, 
in cases affecting only property rights and based upon words. 
Not being so committed, the court was urged to decide upon the 
grounds of equity and expediency, if not upon authority, that in 
such cases there could be no liability.
On the positive side of the question, three cases were cited in 
which liability had not been imposed owing to lack of privity of 
contract.
The Courteen Seed case (Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & 
S. B. Co. 245 N. Y. 377, 1927) was one where the court of appeals 
had held that the defendant bank owed no duty of diligence to the 
plaintiff in connection with a cable sent by a branch of the de­
fendant bank to another bank, which in turn delivered it to the 
plaintiff. The cable was incorrect as to the liability of the plain­
tiff with respect to a certain draft, and the plaintiff, relying upon 
the cable, accepted certain merchandise which it otherwise would 
have rejected. There the necessity of direct relationship was 
expressly recognized, the cable in question not having been 
delivered by the defendant bank to the plaintiff.
The Jaillet case (Jaillet v. Cashman, 115 Misc. 383, affirmed 202 
app. div. 805; 235 N. Y. 511, 1923) was one where a ticker service 
gave wrong information over the tape, which was seen by the 
plaintiff in his broker’s office. In that case the court had held 
that the law does not attempt to impose liability for the violation 
of a duty unless it constitutes a breach of contract, obligation or 
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trust or amounts to a deceit, libel or slander; that there was no 
privity between the plaintiff and the defendant; that the plaintiff 
was but one of the public to whom all news is apt to be dissemi­
nated, and that an action by him could be sustained only in 
case there was a liability by the defendant to every member of the 
community who was misled by the incorrect report. For this the 
defendant was held not to be liable.
The Rensselaer Water Company case (Moch Co. v. Rensselaer 
Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 1928) was one in which a water company 
had failed to supply water to the scene of a fire. There it was 
held that such failure was not actionable on the part of property 
owners, as there was no duty owing by the water company to 
property owners, by contract or by statute.
In arguing on the grounds of equity and expediency, in the 
Ultramares case against the claim of negligence, counsel for the 
Institute urged that to hold professional men and those conduct­
ing a business which, in its nature, is professional work, liable in 
negligence to persons other than those either to whom they had 
rendered a service or with whom they had come into a direct rela­
tionship, and liable to an unlimited number of persons, for an 
unlimited amount, perhaps for an unlimited time, would be neither 
equitable nor expedient.
On this branch of the case the court of appeals was unanimously 
of the opinion that the evidence supported a finding that the 
audit made by the defendant was negligently made. In this 
connection, it might be added, it was realized by counsel for the 
Institute that the greater the negligence shown in this case, the 
more striking would be a decision, if obtained, that there was no 
liability for negligence in cases of this sort, where privity of con­
tract or direct relationship is lacking.
After discussing the various cases cited upon the briefs sub­
mitted, the court of appeals stated that the conclusion was in­
evitable that nothing in the previous decisions committed them 
to a holding of liability for negligence in this case, as such liability, 
if recognized, would be an extension of the principle of those 
decisions to circumstances which were different, even if more 
or less analogous. The opinion of the court then proceeded: 
“The question then is whether such an extension should be 
made.”
The answer to this question in effect was that if such an exten­
sion should be made it would so expand the field of liability for 
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negligent speech as to make it nearly, if not quite, coterminous 
with that of liability for fraud and that a change so revolutionary, 
if expedient, must be wrought by legislation.
The court in its opinion added:
“ If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, 
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of de­
ceptive entries, may expose accountants to liability in an inde­
terminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are 
so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist 
in the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences 
(p. 179).”
Upon the question of negligence, therefore, the judgment of the 
appellate division was reversed and the judgment of the trial 
court was affirmed, so relieving the accountant defendants from 
liability to the plaintiff in negligence, because of the absence of 
privity of contract or direct relationship between them. The 
court pointed out that “liability for negligence, if adjudged in this 
case would extend to many callings other than an auditor’s,” and 
that “explanations that might seem plausible, omissions that 
might be reasonable, if the duty is confined to the employer, con­
ducting a business that presumably at least is not a fraud upon his 
creditors, might wear another aspect if an independent duty to be 
suspicious, even of one’s principal, is owing to investors.”
The court further pointed out that, in such circumstances, 
“everyone making a promise having the quality of a contract 
would be under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise, 
but under another duty apart from contract to an indefinite 
number of potential beneficiaries when performance had begun,” 
and that, “the assumption of one relation would mean the involun­
tary assumption of a series of new relations inescapably hooked 
together.” The court said that, while “assault upon the citadel 
of privity is proceeding in these days apace,” “the law does not 
spread its protection so far.”
To come to such conclusion, of course, the absence of what 
might be called direct relationship between the plaintiff and de­
fendant was essential. The view of the court was that there was 
no liability for negligence on the part of the accountants to an 
indeterminate class. If the court had taken a different view of 
this part of the case the decision on the first question as to liability 
for negligence would certainly have been different. The issuance 
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by the accountants of thirty-two copies of the certificate and the 
possibilities or probabilities of their use did not, evidently, in the 
opinion of the court, take the place of direct relationship. A 
slight change in the facts, however, might have brought the 
plaintiff into a more determinate class, and closer to the ac­
countants, and so might have given a different result.
In this connection Judge Cardozo says, in distinguishing the 
case of Glanzer v. Shepard:
“In the case at hand, the service was primarily for the benefit 
of the Stern company, a convenient instrumentality for use in the 
development of the business, and only incidentally or collaterally 
for the use of those to whom Stern and his associates might exhibit 
it thereafter. Foresight of these possibilities may charge with 
liability for fraud. The conclusion does not follow that it will 
charge with liability for negligence (p. 183).”
Without doubt there is a point, which, when reached, will make 
accountants liable to the persons who may rely on their state­
ments, and for lack of a better term we had called that point— 
direct relationship. Judge Cardozo uses the primary purpose of 
the transaction as the determining factor in establishing liability, 
that is to say “the end and aim of the transaction.”
On page 188 of his opinion, Judge Cardozo illustrates what he 
has in mind with reference to the knowledge of the person making 
the statement as to the use to which it is to be put, and says in 
effect that if accountants are to be liable for negligence in a case 
such as the Ultramares case, lawyers who certify their opinion as 
to the validity of municipal bonds, knowing that their opinion 
will be brought to the notice of the public, will be liable to inves­
tors; and title companies insuring titles to land, with knowledge 
that their insurance will be stated to the bidders at an approaching 
auction, will become liable to purchasers. Judge Cardozo indi­
cates that such liability would be an unwarrantable extension of 
liability for a negligent misstatement.
The court, however, pointed out that its holding as to negli­
gence “does not emancipate accountants from the consequences 
of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so 
negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in 
its adequacy, for this again is fraud.” The court stated that its 
holding “does no more than say that if less than this was proved, 
if there had been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere 
profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the en­
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suing liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the con­
tract, and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the 
contract has been made,” adding that the court doubted 
“whether the average business man, receiving a certificate without 
paying for it and receiving it merely as one among a multitude of 
possible investors, would look for anything more.”
This, then, brought the court to the second cause of action 
which was based upon fraud.
The Question of Fraud
In order to determine whether or not the accountants in this 
case should be held guilty, in the language of the court, either of 
reckless misstatement or insincere profession of an opinion and 
were not merely guilty of an honest blunder, the facts of the case 
which were before the court must be considered by us as they 
were by the court.
The facts involve the certificate of the accountants and the 
nature of the mistakes made by them.
The certificate of the accountants consists of two sentences. 
The first sentence contains statements of fact. The second sen­
tence contains a statement of opinion.
A close examination of the opinion of Judge Cardozo will, I 
believe, demonstrate that the decision of the court of appeals to 
submit to the jury the question of fraud on the part of the 
accountants was based chiefly upon the first sentence of the 
certificate.
This first sentence reads as follows:
“We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
for the year ended December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the 
annexed balance-sheet is in accordance therewith and with the 
information and explanations given us.”
This sentence contains the following three statements of 
fact:
1. That the accountants had examined the accounts;
2. That the balance-sheet was in accordance with the accounts; 
and
3. That the balance-sheet was in accordance with the explana­
tions and information given to them.
As to the first statement of fact the court, in its opinion, said 
nothing.
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As to the second statement of fact the court said:
“Scienter has been declared to be an indispensable element 
except where the representation has been put forward as true of 
one’s own knowledge (p. 186). . . .
“The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, 
that the balance sheet was in accordance with the books of ac­
count. If this statement was false they are not to be exonerated, 
because they believed it to be true. . . . We think the triers of 
the facts might hold it to be false (p. 189). ... In this connec­
tion we are to bear in mind the principle already stated in the 
course of this opinion that negligence or blindness, even when 
not equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an 
inference of fraud. At least this is so if negligence is gross 
(p. 190).”
From this it is clear that the court considered the statement that 
the balance-sheet was in accordance with the accounts as subject 
to the inference that it was made by the accountants as of their 
own knowledge.
As to the third statement of fact, the court made no particular 
comment, but it is evident that the court considered the statement 
that the balance-sheet was in accordance with the accounts as 
separate from and independent of the statement that the balance- 
sheet was in accordance with the explanations and information 
given.
If the statement of the accountants that the balance-sheet was 
in accordance with the accounts was unqualified, it must be read 
and considered in connection with the errors committed by the 
accountants in making the audit.
These errors resulted in a misstatement of net assets of about 
$1,000,000 where the gross assets involved were slightly in excess 
of $2,550,000. The chief errors were:
1. Including in the total of accounts receivable in the general 
ledger, a certain total item of sales posted for December, 1923, 
amounting to $706,000, which was fictitious and not supported by 
proper sales invoices, this item immediately following another 
total item of sales of $644,000 in the same account for the same 
month. The circumstances surrounding the entry of the $706,000 
item were also otherwise suspicious. Among other things, this 
item was entered in a handwriting different from the previous 
one of $644,000.
2. Acceptance of an account, entered in the accounts-payable 
ledger, which showed on its face a balance of $113,000 receivable, 
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instead of a balance payable, as such an account would normally 
show.
These two errors were made in the face of certain danger signals 
set against the accountants, all of which they disregarded and ran 
by. Among others, there were:
1. Discrepancies in reports to the defendants by banks which 
indicated that the same accounts receivable had been pledged with 
more than one bank;
2. The fact that the inventory, originally furnished to the 
defendants, aggregating $347,000, included merchandise, aggre­
gating $303,000, which should not have been included and which 
was rejected by the accountants.
It was shown in connection with the first error that if the item 
of sales of $706,000 had been inquired into it would have been 
found that such item had no support in the journal, nor in the 
journal vouchers, nor in the debit memo book, which was a sum­
mary of the invoices, nor in anything except the invoices them­
selves, and that such invoices were not in regular form and were 
evidently fictitious.
The court pointed out that the accountants did not say 
that they ever looked at the invoices but they did admit, 
if they had looked, that they would have found omissions 
and irregularities so many and unusual as to call for further 
investigation.
The court left it to the jury for decision whether "correspond­
ence between the balance-sheets and the books imports some­
thing more . . . than correspondence between the balance-sheet 
and the ledger, unsupported or even contradicted by every other 
record.” In other words, the jury first must determine the fun­
damental question whether the statement imports more than 
examination of the general ledger. A negative answer to this 
question would defeat liability inasmuch as it is conceded that the 
general ledger and the audit agreed. An affirmative answer, 
however, would not automatically impose liability. In such 
circumstances, it would be for the jury to determine whether the 
evidence showed that the statement of accountants as to corre­
spondence must have been either false or based upon a reckless 
disregard of the facts.
The court concludes:
“When we couple the refusal to say that they did look with the 
admission that if they had looked, they would or could have seen, 
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the situation is revealed as one in which a jury might reasonably 
find that in truth they did not look, but certified the correspond­
ence without testing its existence (p. 190). ”
It is very clear from the opinion that the court considered that 
the statement in the first sentence of the certificate—that the bal­
ance-sheet was in accordance with the accounts—might be held 
to be false, and that the negligence on the part of the accountants 
might be held to be gross. From this follows the conclusion that 
the question of fraud for misstatement of fact should be submitted 
to the jury for determination.
The second sentence of the certificate reads:
"We further certify, that subject to the provisions of federal 
taxes on income, the said statement, in our opinion, presents a 
true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.”
The court held that, because of the fact that a jury might find 
that the accountants had in the first sentence of the certificate 
certified a correspondence between balance-sheet and accounts 
that did not exist, and that such statement had been made by 
the defendants as true to their own knowledge, it might also be 
found by a jury that the same accountants had acted without 
information leading to a sincere or genuine belief, when they 
certified in the second sentence to an opinion that the balance- 
sheet presented a true and correct view of the actual condition 
of the business.
Judge Cardozo had already said:
“Even an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, may be 
found to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy 
as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back 
of it (p. 186). ”
The gravamen, however, of the question of fraud lies in the 
first sentence of the certificate which constitutes a certification of 
a fact as being true to the knowledge of the accountants, which, if 
false, whether believed to be true or not, would lay the account­
ants open to a charge that the statement was made either with 
fraudulent intent or recklessly. In either of these events they 
might be held liable for deceit or fraud.
Without the first sentence of the certificate it might well have 
been that the court of appeals would not have held that the ques­
tion of fraud on the part of the accountants, with reference to the 
expression of opinion contained in the second sentence of the
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certificate, should have been submitted to the jury. It is upon 
the first sentence particularly that the court hangs its con­
clusion.
It must be emphasized that the court did not hold that the 
accountants were guilty of fraud but held merely that the evidence 
was such that the question of fraud should be submitted to the 
jury. The question of fact will always remain as to whether or 
not a statement is false and whether or not an opinion professed 
is a sincere one. It will always be for the court to decide whether 
or not in the testimony there is any evidence which would justify 
a submission of these questions, and so the question of fraud, to 
the jury.
Two Other Questions
The opinion refers to the practice known as “testing and 
sampling” but draws attention to the fact that the accountants 
do not assert, in connection with the first error, that any of the 
seventeen invoices supporting the fictitious sales were among 
the number so selected, and continues:
“Verification by test and sample was very likely a sufficient 
audit as to accounts regularly entered upon the books in the usual 
course of business. It was plainly insufficient, however, as to 
accounts not entered upon the books where inspection of the 
invoices was necessary, not as a check upon accounts fair upon 
their face, but in order to ascertain whether there were any ac­
counts at all. If the only invoices inspected were invoices un­
related to the interpolated entry, the result was to certify a 
correspondence between the books and the balance sheet without 
any effort by the auditors, as to $706,000 of accounts, to ascer­
tain whether the certified agreement was in accordance with the 
truth. How far books of account fair upon their face are to be 
probed by accountants in an effort to ascertain whether the trans­
actions back of them are in accordance with the entries, involves 
to some extent the exercise of judgment and discretion. Not so, 
however, the inquiry whether the entries certified as there, are 
there in very truth, there in the form and in the places where men 
of business training would expect them to be. The defendants 
were put on their guard by the circumstances touching the De­
cember accounts receivable to scrutinize with special care. A 
jury might find that with suspicions thus awakened, they closed 
their eyes to the obvious, and blindly gave assent (p. 192).”
And finally, the court held that the defendants were liable for 
acts and omissions of their subordinates to whom they had dele­
gated the performance of their work.
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The question remains—What does the Ultramares decision 
mean and where does it leave accountants?
As far as negligence is concerned, their liability is just what it 
was generally by accountants supposed to be before the Ultra­
mares case was begun and what it was generally by accountants 
hoped to be just before the court of appeals passed on the case, 
namely a liability to those with whom they have been in privity 
of contract and to those with whom they have been in direct 
relationship.
So far as their liability in fraud is concerned, accountants have 
always known that this extended beyond those persons with 
whom they might be in privity of contract or direct relationship.
This had been held (Eaton Cole & Burnham Co. v. Avery, 83 
N. Y. 31) as early as 1880, and confirmed in later cases, although 
there is a limit to this liability even in fraud, as pointed out 
by Judge Cardozo, where he says in his opinion in the Ultra­
mares case: “A representation, even though knowingly false, 
does not constitute ground for an action of deceit unless made 
with the intent to be communicated to the person or class of per­
sons who act upon it to their prejudice.” It is apparent from the 
opinion of Judge Cardozo and from the authorities generally, that 
in the case of fraud the class of persons to whom there may be 
liability is more extensive than in the case of negligence. The 
decision of the court of appeals holds that the plaintiff in the 
Ultramares case was in a class of persons who might complain in 
fraud, if acting upon a false statement of the defendant. Judge 
Cardozo said that charity of construction would not exonerate 
accountants from the inference that their representations in­
volved a profession of knowledge as distinguished from belief, 
inasmuch as by the very nature of their calling they “profess to 
speak with knowledge when certifying to an agreement between 
the audit and the entries.”
The question that is now chiefly troubling the accountancy 
profession is: What is fraud and what does it embrace? The prin­
ciples upon which must rest the liability of accountants to stran­
gers, as well as to those with whom they may have been in direct 
relationship, for fraud or for the equivalent of fraud are not 
novel. It would be idle to maintain that accountants should not 
be liable for what commonly is termed and known as fraud, that 
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is to say, a statement knowingly false, made with the purpose and 
intent that it should be acted upon. However, in this country at 
least, when a statement is made as of the speaker’s knowledge, it 
is the falsity of such statement and not the knowledge that the 
statement is false, that is material, otherwise the additional factor 
would have to be added, that the statement was made with knowl­
edge that it was false. The absence of knowledge of falsity does 
not excuse.
For authority for this proposition we must look to other walks 
of life, in view of the absence of authority in the United States 
connected with accountancy; and in other walks of life the au­
thority as to this is perfectly clear.
In an early case in New York (Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238, 
1860) the agent of a vendor of land gave a minute description of 
the locality and quantity of land which the vendor was selling. 
The court held that the minuteness of the description implied 
that the vendor himself gave this information as of his own 
knowledge. The description was false. This the vendor and the 
agent did not know. The court held that the question of fraud 
had been fairly submitted to the jury and affirmed the judgment 
which held the vendor liable to the purchaser for damages in 
fraud.
In a later case (Hadcock v. Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604, 1897) the 
defendant made a statement that a man was solvent and would 
be able to pay the plaintiff. The man was, in fact, insolvent and 
unable to pay. The plaintiff recovered in fraud, although it was 
not shown that the defendant knew of the insolvency.
In a still more recent case {Ottinger v. Bennett, 144 app. div. 
525, containing the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Miller on 
which the court of appeals based its decision, 203 N. Y. 554, 1911) 
the court held that if a dividend were declared out of capital, 
when there was a statute that dividends could be declared only 
out of surplus, such action might be held to be a fraudulent state­
ment on the part of the directors. The court further held in effect 
that such action might be considered equivalent to a reckless 
statement made without knowledge. There the relationship 
was not close.
Untrue statements in a prospectus concerning mining stock, 
although believed by the president of the company issuing the 
prospectus to be true, have been held to be the basis of a recovery 
in fraud, because the defendant made the statements of his own 
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knowledge (Bystrom v. Villard, 175 app. div. 433, N. Y. 1916). 
There also the relationship was not close.
A plaintiff (Archibald & Lewis Co. v. Banque Intern, de Com­
merce. 216 app. div. 322, N. Y. 1926) wired a defendant bank 
asking whether certain collateral had been forwarded. The bank 
made reasonable inquiries and wired that the collateral had been 
sent. This was untrue, and, on being unable to collect on the 
note, the plaintiff was allowed to recover from the bank for 
fraudulent misrepresentations, inasmuch as the bank had made 
the statement as of its own knowledge.
A promoter of a corporation {Owens v. Waterhouse, 225 app. 
div. 582, N. Y. 1929) was held liable to a plaintiff for statements 
concerning the corporation which were untrue, although the 
promoter may have believed them to be true at the time he made 
them.
A close analogy to such liability for fraud of the character here 
discussed is found in the statutory provision that wanton conduct 
may take the place of specific intent even in first degree murder 
(Sec. 1044 penal law of the consolidated laws of New York, 
1909). The provision reads as follows:
“The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifi­
able, is murder in the first degree, when committed: . . .
(2) By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a 
depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without a 
premeditated design to effect the death of any individual.”
This statute was based upon the common law which it was in­
tended to clarify. Thus, a man firing a pistol into a house in 
which he knew there were people, with no intent to kill, but taking 
no precaution against killing, has been held guilty of first degree 
murder, although ordinarily a specific intent is necessary (People 
v. Jernatowski, 238 N. Y. 188, 1924).
So we see that an accountant’s liability for fraud as stated by 
Judge Cardozo in his opinion is not different from the liability in 
other cases imposed upon vendors of land, presidents and directors 
of corporations, banks, promoters, and ordinary individuals in 
ordinary walks of life.
It should be remembered, therefore, that a statement made by 
an accountant as a fact true to his own knowledge, and not merely 
as an opinion, will subject him to an action for fraud where such an 
action might hot lie if the form of certificate did not contain such 
a statement of fact, and so did not leave the accountant open to
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attack on the ground of the falsity of his statement. For an 
opinion to form the basis of a claim for fraud, the opinion, as 
Judge Cardozo said, must have been flimsy and recklessly given 
or without sincere or genuine belief.
Practical Aspects of the Ultramares Case
Accountants perhaps fear that they may be held guilty of 
fraud by some judge or jury if they have omitted or have done 
imperfectly one of the numerous things that they might do, but 
all of which, as a practical matter, it is impossible for them to do 
in any one audit. This is true, but it is no more true of ac­
countants than of all business men, and no more true of fraud 
than it always has been of negligence.
Accountants, however, should not fear that courts or juries will 
be unreasonable in their application to their business of the princi­
ples which I have been discussing. As an indication of this, 
read the opinion of Judge Kellogg in the Fulton Trust Company 
case (In the Matter of Fulton Trust Co., decided July 15, 1931, 
by the New York court of appeals, as yet unreported). The sur­
rogate had surcharged the trust company, as trustee under a will, 
for failure to sell certain securities belonging to the deceased, 
which it was authorized by the will to retain, but they had been 
retained to the great loss of the trust, due to a constant decline in 
the market price of the securities. There was evidence showing 
that the trustee had considered the matter; that it was not careless. 
Judge Kellogg states: “ The distinction between negligence and mere 
error of judgment must be borne in mind. ” The opinion concludes :
“Under the circumstances, we think that the trustee, as the 
event has proven, was guilty, at the very most, of an error of judg­
ment, in not making sale of the stocks at an earlier date. It may 
have been deficient in prevision and prophecy; it was not lacking 
in the exercise of care.”
The decision of the surrogate was reversed.
This case shows that the court of appeals is not unmindful 
of the possibilities and practical aspects of a situation and will 
not harshly impose liability.
Then, also, much might be done with the form of the account­
ant’s certificate. Why not confine the statements of fact in the 
certificate to those things which can be stated as facts, if there are 
any, and give opinion as to what is susceptible only of opinion ?
If this had been done in the Ultramares certificate the main 
hook upon which Judge Cardozo hung his opinion would have 
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been lacking. Persons should not make statements without 
knowing that they are true—especially professional men. The 
professional man necessarily, when he deals in opinions, is exempt 
from certain responsibilities but is still held to others. He may 
reasonably be expected to have average or fair competency in his 
calling and to be held responsible for gross negligence and for gross 
incompetency.
If an accountant states that books and accounts are correct, 
without knowing that the books and accounts are correct, he is 
acting in disregard of the rights of others and in disregard of his 
duty to the public as well as to his employer. In this same cate­
gory might well be placed a statement of opinion where in fact 
there was no opinion—at least, no opinion which could be con­
sidered as an expression of a state of mind arrived at after proper 
consideration had been given to the subject involved.
With the increasing complexity of business and of the methods 
of handling business, there is an increasing need for authoritative 
data and accurate statements. As the average man knows per­
sonally less about his own business or the business in which he 
may be interested than he did before, he is in need of being told 
even more than before. This is the opportunity of the account­
ant. But, as there is, on the one hand, a more general and wide­
spread demand and need for information concerning the financial 
condition of business of corporations, caused, among other things, 
by the increased investment in their securities on the part of the 
public, so there is, on the other hand, an increasing danger and 
difficulty, so far as accountancy is concerned, in examining the 
condition of such corporations and in reporting upon them. The 
increase of demand and opportunity bears with it an increase of 
responsibility. They go hand in hand. The accountant who is 
able to meet this situation and give service which can be relied 
upon will reap his reward.
Conclusion
The chief contention of the accountancy profession in this case 
was that an accountant should not be held liable for negligence to 
a stranger but only to a person with whom he has come into direct 
relationship. This contention was sustained. An accountant’s 
liability for fraud, like that of everyone else, has never been limited 
to those with whom he may be in contractual or direct relationship.
To give out a false statement, to make a statement or give an 
opinion without any foundation whatsoever to support it, to be 
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guilty of gross negligence have generally been held to be evidence 
of fraud. A judge in the first instance and a jury finally must 
pass on the facts to determine whether such facts come within 
the boundaries of these principles. This is as far as Judge Car­
dozo’s opinion goes.
As to the uncertainty regarding what may or may not consti­
tute fraud—it is impossible for the court to say that certain con­
duct and only certain conduct will make an accountant liable for 
fraud or even for negligence. The breadth of the rule must be 
increased as the breadth of the violation increases so as to 
embrace the violation. The vast and expanding nature of an ac­
countant’s business does, it is true, make this matter more vital 
and more serious for him than for men engaged in many other 
lines of business.
As it is impossible for the court to set down definite rules with 
regard to what facts shall constitute fraud and what facts shall not 
come within the definition of fraud, it is, of course, also impossi­
ble for the legislature to define fraud explicitly. The ingenuity of 
laymen, if not of lawyers, would circumvent any such definition. 
The rule of reason must govern in such cases.
In this connection it might be remarked that what in the past 
might not have been considered to be reckless or to constitute 
negligence, today might well come within a reasonable definition 
of such words. Accountants as well as lawyers, doctors and other 
professional men must expect to be held to a stricter account of 
their professional ability, as the factors with which they deal 
become more intricate. It is reasonable to anticipate that the 
spread of knowledge and what might be called civilization will 
certainly increase the liability of everyone. Each addition to 
the realm of knowledge increases responsibility. Each complica­
tion of civilization complicates with it the rights and duties of men 
towards one another. Every privilege which is gained carries 
with it a complementary responsibility. No one driving an 
automobile along a crowded thoroughfare can be ignorant of this, 
and if he should claim to be, the claim will do him little good 
when the sentence of fine or imprisonment is about to be imposed.
And as we can not tell how knowledge and culture may expand, 
so we can not tell how liability and responsibility will expand along 
with them. This, of course, may be unsatisfactory to accountants 
and to others, but it is a reality, taught by history and experience.
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